How Demand Information Can Destabilize a Cartel by Karlinger, Liliane
 
WORKING   PAPERS 
 
 
Liliane Karlinger 
 
 
How Demand Information Can Destabilize a Cartel 
 
February 2008 
 
Working Paper No: 0803 
 
 
 
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
 
UNIVERSITY  OF  VIENNA 
 
All our working papers are available at: http://mailbox.univie.ac.at/papers.econ 
How Demand Information Can Destabilize a
Cartel ∗
Liliane Karlinger†
February 21, 2008
Abstract
This paper studies a symmetric Bertrand duopoly with imperfect mon-
itoring where firms receive noisy public signals about the state of demand.
These signals have two opposite effects on the incentive to collude: avoid-
ing punishment after a low-demand period increases collusive profits, mak-
ing collusion more attractive, but it also softens the threat of punishment,
which increases the temptation to undercut the rival. There are cases
where the latter effect dominates, and so the collusive equilibrium does
not always exist when it does absent demand information. These findings
are related to the Sugar Institute Case studied by Genesove and Mullin
(2001).
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1 Introduction
Competition authorities tend to be alarmed when they discover mechanisms or
institutions which provide firm-level information on prices or quantities to com-
petitors in oligopolistic industries. Two examples from EU case law are the UK
Tractor Case (1992), and the Cement Case (1994). In the UK Tractor Case, the
UK trade association of manufacturers and importers of agricultural machinery
(Agricultural Engineers Association Ltd) collected information on tractor regis-
tration (vehicle licensing) from the Department of Transport and distributed it
to its members. This information identified the retail sales and market shares of
each of the eight firms on the UK market with detailed breakdowns by product,
territory and time periods. The Cement Case differed from the UK Tractor
Case insofar as it was price information (not sales) that was communicated by
the European Cement Association (Cembureau) to its members (cement man-
ufacturers from 19 European countries).
The European Commission’s tough stance in these cases is well-grounded on
a body of academic work (discussed in more detail in the next section) studying
if and how firms can sustain collusion in an environment where rivals’ actions
are only imperfectly observable. The conventional wisdom arising from this
literature is that, compared to an environment of perfect monitoring, collusion
will in general be more difficult to sustain, because deviators are harder to detect
and to punish, making the industry more susceptible to cheating.
But can we conclude that market information will always and unambiguously
facilitate collusion? The purpose of this paper is to show that there are instances
where collusion may actually be easier (not harder) to sustain without such
information. I analyze a repeated symmetric Bertrand duopoly with uncertain
demand, where firms cannot observe the competitor’s price, but they receive a
noisy public signal about the demand realization. This signal could correspond
for instance to the publication of (aggregated or firm-level) sales data for a
particular industry. The signal is noisy in both directions: It may erroneously
indicate that demand was high when it was in fact low, and vice versa. The
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noise is crucial in producing the result.
I study the existence of collusive equilibria sustained by optimal collusive
strategies where firms coordinate their actions on the public information his-
tory. In the benchmark model without signals, whenever at least one firm
realized zero profits, optimal punishment requires that firms coordinate on a
randomization device, and either jointly stay in the collusive phase or revert to
the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium forever. This implies that, along the equilibrium
path, collusion is jeopardized every time a low-demand state is realized, even
though nobody defected. I first show that if the colluding firms receive public
demand information (in addition to their observations on own profits), they will
optimally avoid Nash reversion whenever profits are zero and the signal indi-
cates that demand was low. Thus, signals increase collusive profits and hence
make collusion more attractive.
However, the contribution of this paper is to show that conditioning on
such imperfect signals also has a downside for the firms: Suppose that one firm
defected, but the signal (accurately or wrongly) indicates that demand was low.
Then, the probability of Nash reversion is zero, i.e. the cheating firm will get
away with the defection. This can never happen in an environment without
signals, where the probability of Nash reversion is always strictly positive when
a defection has occurred. Thus, signals weaken the punishment mechanism,
thus undermining compliance with the collusive arrangement. I show that if
negative demand shocks are rather unlikely, this second effect dominates the
positive effect of transparency which has been stressed in the literature so far.
As a result, signals may raise the minimum discount factor required to sustain
collusion, so that collusion is less likely to arise.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature.
Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 studies how the introduction of signals
into the game affects the existence of collusive equilibria and their properties.
Section 5 relates the results to what may be the most prominent example of a
collusive trade association in the economic literature, the Sugar Institute Case
as studied by Genesove and Mullin (2001), and draws some policy conclusions.
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Finally, Section 6 summarizes the main findings and concludes.
2 Related Literature
In his seminal paper of 1964, Stigler was the first to analyze the case of a
Bertrand-type oligopoly where each firm’s prices are unobservable to its com-
petitors (i.e. each firm can grant secret price cuts to its customers). Stigler
(1964) concluded that without observability of prices, collusion will in general
be more difficult to sustain, but can still arise if the cartel provides the right
incentives.
Following Stigler’s (1964) approach, Green and Porter (1984) developed their
model to show that given stochastic demand shocks, price wars need not be the
result of a collapse of collusion, but should rather be interpreted as part of
the firms’ equilibrium strategies to ensure tacit collusion in a non-cooperative
framework.
Stigler’s (1964) and Green-Porter’s (1984) work inspired a growing literature
on firm behavior under non-observability of competitors’ actions. In particular,
Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1986, 1990) analyzed optimal punishment strate-
gies in oligopolies with imperfect monitoring, showing that every symmetric
sequential equilibrium payoff in the Green-Porter model can be supported by
sequential equilibria having an extremely simple intertemporal structure. Fu-
denberg, Levine and Maskin (1994) identify conditions for the folk theorem to
apply in repeated games in which players observe a public outcome that im-
perfectly signals the actions played. My paper is most closely related to this
literature, both in terms of the structure of the game studied as well as the
questions addressed in the analysis.
Note that a public signal serves two distinct purposes in these games: first,
it provides information to the agents (which could be achieved by a private
signal as well), and second, it also allows firms to coordinate their behavior
on the signal’s realizations (which is not the case for a (noisy) private signal,
as then the state of the world will no longer be common knowledge among
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the agents). The properties of repeated games with imperfect monitoring and
privately observed signals are not yet well understood; one way to resolve the
coordination problem in such a model is to allow for communication between
players, as shown in Kandori and Matsushima (1998) and Compte (1998).
A different, but related strand of literature studies whether firms find it
profitable to share private information with each other. While each firm will
always want to learn its rivals’ information, it is not clear that the firm will also
find it in its interest to voluntarily disclose the information it holds itself. The
incentives to share information with rival firms was formally studied by Vives
(1984) in a duopoly model with differentiated products where firms have private
information about an uncertain linear demand. Vives finds that if the goods
are substitutes, it is a dominant strategy for each firm to share information in
Bertrand competition, while it is not under Cournot competition. Moreover, the
result is reversed if the goods are complements. These findings were generalized
by Raith (1996). Experimental evidence on information sharing is provided by
Cason and Mason (1999), who found that the information sharing itself did not
substantially increase tacit collusion.
The empirical work on collusion with imperfect monitoring generally finds
that improving transparency in an industry leads to significant and stable price
increases above the competitive level. Well-known examples include the US
railroad grain rates in the 1980’s (see Fuller et al. (1990)) and the Danish
ready-mixed concrete market in the early 1990’s (see Albæk et al. (1997)). The
striking feature of these two examples is that the relevant market information
was not provided by a cartel or trade association, but by government agencies,
who were certainly hoping to achieve the opposite effect.
A related problem regards oligopolistic markets where the buyers are the
ones who can only imperfectly observe seller’s prices (while the sellers can),
i.e. the market is not ”transparent”. One interesting result of this work is
that increasing market transparency may not be unambiguously beneficial for
consumers (see Nilsson (1999) for a search-cost approach, and Møllgaard and
Overgaard (2000) for a product-differentiation approach). If buyers cannot fully
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observe all prices on the market, it is difficult for firms to steal business from
their rivals. This reduces the incentives to cheat, but it also makes it harder to
punish a defector. If the latter effect dominates, collusion cannot arise, and so
consumers are actually better off than if they could fully observe all prices.
Finally, in an oligopoly with uncertain demand, each firm could choose as
its strategy a ”supply function” relating its quantity to its price, rather than a
fixed price or a fixed quantity. Klemperer and Meyer (1989) give conditions for
existence and for uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium in supply functions under
uncertainty and compare the equilibrium with the Cournot and Bertrand equi-
libria when the demand and cost curves, the number of firms, and the form of
uncertainty vary. This approach is also taken in Fabra (2003), who compares
the level and conduct of collusion under uniform and discriminatory auctions.
She finds that uniform auctions facilitate collusion more than discriminatory
auctions: the optimal penal code is equally severe under the two formats; but
bidders’ deviation incentives are weaker in uniform auctions given that the pay-
off irrelevant bids can be used to relax the enforcement problem.
3 The model
This section builds on Tirole’s (1988) illustration of the Green and Porter (1984)
model. Consider an infinitely repeated duopoly game where two symmetric firms
produce perfect substitutes at constant marginal cost. The firms choose prices
every period. Buyers can perfectly observe both prices and will all buy from
the low-price firm. Each firm only knows its own price but cannot observe
the rival’s price. This situation will typically arise in customer markets where
the buyers are large firms searching the market for potential input providers;
examples would include the Lysine cartel as described in Connor (1999), or the
Sugar Institute discussed in more detail in Section 5.1
Demand for the product is stochastic; with probability α, demand will be
1The assumption that buyers can fully observe prices (while firms cannot) may seem some-
what strong. We make this assumption to isolate the issue of imperfect monitoring among
competitors from that of observability by buyers. For a discussion of the literature on limited
price observability by buyers, see Section 2.
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zero in a given period (the ”low-demand state”), and with probability 1 − α,
demand will be positive (the ”high-demand state”). Realizations are assumed
to be iid over time. Firms cannot directly observe the state of demand.
For the high-demand state, denote the per-period monopoly profits by Πm.
We assume that the two firms share the market equally whenever they charge
the same price. Thus, in a period of high demand, each firm’s profit under
collusion will be Πm/2. Next-period’s profits are discounted at rate δ < 1.
If a firm realizes profits Πm/2, it can perfectly infer the other firm’s behavior
and vice versa. Then, it is common knowledge that demand was high and both
firms set the collusive price. If instead a firm does not sell anything at some
date, it does not know apriori whether this is due to a low realization of demand
or to its competitor charging a lower price. Each firm can however observe its
own profits; thus, it is always common knowledge that at least one firm realized
zero profits (because then either demand is low, hence the other firm realized
zero profits as well, or the other firm undercut).
In addition to their observations of own profits, the firms receive a noisy
signal on the demand realization after each period.2 The signals are iid over
time, and can be characterized as follows (see table below): If the actual state
of demand was low (D = 0), the signal will indicate low demand (S = 0) with
probability σl, and wrongly indicate high demand (S = 1) with probability
1 − σl. Conversely, if the actual state of demand was high (D = 1), the signal
will correctly indicate this with probability σh, and wrongly indicate low demand
with probability 1− σh. Probabilities σl and σh are known to the firms.
Signal indicates:
low (S = 0) high (S = 1)
State of demand: low (D = 0) σl 1− σl
high (D = 1) 1− σh σh
Assume that the signal is informative, i.e. σl > 12 and σh >
1
2 . Signal
precision may vary across demand states, i.e. it could be that σl 6= σh. The
2Firms do not incur any cost to receive this signal, nor do they disclose any information
themselves. Think of this signal as being exogenously provided, for instance by a trade
association or government agency.
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signal is public, so that its realization is common knowledge.
Under the information structure imposed above, play of the infinitely re-
peated game generates both a private and a public information history. For
each firm, the sequence of its prices and sales in each period constitutes its pri-
vate history. The public history is the sequence of information which both firms
observe. In our case, at each stage, it is common knowledge whether or not at
least one firm realized zero profits, and whether the signal indicated high or low
demand.
We will now study how the firms can collude given the signal extraction
problem introduced above. Following the approach of Abreu, Pearce, and Stac-
chetti (1986), the relevant collusive equilibrium can be characterized as follows:
along the collusive path, the two firms charge the collusive price until at least
one firm makes zero profit. Both this event and the realization of the demand
signal are now public history. If the demand signal indicates that demand was
low, the collusive phase optimally continues with probability 1. If instead the
signal indicates high demand, optimal punishment requires that firms coordi-
nate on a randomization device, and either jointly stay in the collusive phase or
revert to the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium forever.
We restrict attention to symmetric perfect public equilibria (SPPE) in pure
strategies. An SPPE is a symmetric strategy profile in which players condi-
tion their actions on the public history (not on their private information) at
each point in time. Along the lines of Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1986),
we transform the repeated game into an equivalent static game in which the
payoffs are decomposed into the sum of a stage game payoff and a continuation
value. After the realization of profits and the demand signal, in each period a
public random variable is first drawn and then observed by all players. This
public randomization device allows the two firms to coordinate on the punish-
ment. Denote by v = 0 the minmax of the repeated game, and by v (δ, α, σl, σh)
the ex-ante maximal payoff. Then the set of payoffs supported by SPPE is
ES (δ, α) = [v, v (δ, α, σl, σh)], which is compact, non-empty and convex. More-
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over, an SPPE that supports the ex-ante maximal payoff v (δ, α, σl, σh) always
exists. We focus on this optimal SPPE because it is Pareto-dominant from the
point of view of the firms.
This optimal equilibrium can be implemented by randomizing only between
the two extremal points of the set ES (δ, α). Firms start playing the monopoly
price and, depending on the public information, they will stick to that strategy
with a certain probability, and move to Nash reversion with the complementary
probability. Formally, one of four events, i = 1, . . . , 4, will occur at each stage
game, where pii denotes Event i’s probability:
Event i D S Probability pii
1 1 1 (1− α)σh
2 1 0 (1− α) (1− σh)
3 0 0 ασl
4 0 1 α (1− σl)
If both firms collude, then the public history observed by both firms allows
them to distinguish each of the four events. Denoting by βi the probability
of Nash reversion following Event i, the optimal collusive equilibrium can be
written as the solution to the following problem:
max{βi}4i=1 v = (1− α) Πm/2 + δ
4∑
i=1
pii [(1− βi) v + βiv]
subject to:
(1) v ≥ (1− α) Πm + δ {(pi2 + pi3) [(1− β3) v + β3v] + (pi1 + pi4) [(1− β4) v + β4v]}
(2) {βi}4i=1 ∈ [0, 1]
Constraint (1) represents the firms’ incentive compatibility constraint: col-
lusion is sustainable if the collusive payoff, v, is at least as high as the payoff
from cheating. If a firm cheats while the other continues to collude, it can ap-
propriate the full monopoly profit Πm, provided demand is high in the period
when cheating occurs. In any case, the firm that was cheated on will make
zero profits. With the unconditional probability that the signal indicates low
demand, Pr(S = 0) = pi2 + pi3, the other firm will believe that Event 3 has
occurred, so that Nash reversion will be triggered with probability β3. Analo-
gously, with probability Pr(S = 1) = pi1 + pi4, the public history is identical to
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the one that would arise after Event 4, and so Nash reversion will be triggered
with probability β4.
Proposition 1 If demand signals are available,
(i) The collusive equilibrium yielding maximal payoff v (δ, α, σl, σh) exists
for δ arbitrarily close to 1 iff α < σh1+σh−σl .
(ii) The equilibrium strategies are as follows: firms never punish if they
both make profits of Πm/2, or if they make zero profits and the demand signal
indicates that demand was low, i.e. they optimally set β∗1 = β
∗
2 = β
∗
3 = 0. If
they make zero profits and the demand signal indicates that demand was high,
they will switch to Nash reversion with probability
β∗4 =
1− δ
δ [(1− α)σh − α (1− σl)] .
Proof: see appendix. 
It is quite intuitive that the firms will not punish if they both make positive
profits: if a firm makes profits of Πm/2, it can immediately infer that the other
firm colluded as well, i.e. there is no inference problem. More interestingly, I
show that whenever firms make zero profit, and the demand signal indicates
that demand was low, it is optimal not to punish. Given that the signal is
imperfect, it is not obvious that it is always optimal to set β3 = 0. One could
imagine a situation where firms punish with strictly positive (though possibly
different) probabilities both when S = 0 and when S = 1. However, in the
proof of Proposition 1, I show that firms can always increase their payoffs if
they trade off punishment when S = 0 against punishment when S = 1. More
precisely, v unambiguously increases whenever firms reduce β3 while increasing
β4 by just enough to keep the incentive constraint unchanged.
The benchmark case without signals Consider now the same situation,
but without any demand signals. Then, the only event that firms can condition
punishment on is the profit realization.
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maxγ1,γ2 v = (1− α) Πm/2 + δ {(1− α) [(1− γ1) v + γ1v] + α [(1− γ2) v + γ2v]}
subject to:
(1a) v ≥ (1− α) Πm + δ [(1− γ2) v + γ2v]
(2a) γ1, γ2 ∈ [0, 1]
As shown in Amelio and Biancini (2007), firms will never find it optimal to
punish when they make positive profits, while punishing with positive probabil-
ity whenever they realize zero profits. The solution to the optimization problem
without demand signals can be characterized as follows (see Amelio and Biancini
(2007) for the proof):
(i) The collusive equilibrium yielding maximal payoff v (δ, α) exists for δ
arbitrarily close to 1 iff α < 12 .
(ii) The equilibrium strategies are as follows: firms never punish if they both
make profits of Πm/2, i.e. they optimally set γ∗1 = 0. If they make zero profits,
they will switch to Nash reversion with probability
γ∗2 =
1− δ
δ (1− 2α) .
I fist inspection of the two maximization problems shows that the introduc-
tion of signals has two distinct effects:
(i) The value of collusion increases when signals are available: If the signal
correctly indicates low demand, punishment will be avoided, which increases
the probability of continuing the collusive phase next period.
(ii) The value of defection changes as well (in fact, it increases) because a
defecting firm now has a higher probability of getting away with the defection:
If demand was high, but the signal wrongly indicates low demand, or instead
demand was low, and the signal correctly indicates low demand, punishment
will not be triggered.
The two effects therefore work in opposite directions: they make both com-
pliance and defection more attractive, and it is not obvious which of these effects
will dominate.
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4 Equilibria with and without signals
We will now study how the introduction of signals into the game affects the
existence of collusive SPPEs and their properties.
We argued above that if δ can be arbitrarily close to 1, the collusive equilib-
rium will exist
(i) with signals: iff α < σh1+σh−σl ≡ αS
(ii) without signals: iff α < 12 ≡ αnoS
Comparing the two upper bounds on α, we find the following:
Proposition 2 For δ arbitrarily close to 1, the range of values of α compat-
ible with collusion is larger when demand signals are available, i.e. αS > αnoS.
If signals are sufficiently accurate, collusion can be sustained for any α ∈ [0, 1).
Proof: We claim that
σh
1 + σh − σl >
1
2
This expression simplifies to
σh + σl > 1
which always holds by our assumption that the signals are informative, i.e.
σl >
1
2 and σh >
1
2 . Note that as σl → 1, we have that αS → 1, which
concludes the proof of Proposition2. 
Let us now turn to the minimum discount factors required to sustain collu-
sion with and without signals. Recall that we must have β∗4 ≤ 1. This condition
can be rearranged to read
δ ≥ 1
1 + (1− α)σh − α (1− σl) ≡ δS
where δS is the lower bound on δ for collusion to be sustainable when signals
are available.
The corresponding expression for the game without signals derives from γ∗2 ≤
1, and reads
δ ≥ 1
2 (1− α) ≡ δnoS
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Comparing the two lower bounds on δ, we find that signals have an ambigu-
ous impact on the minimum discount factor: For low levels of α, firms will have
to be more patient under signals than without signals:
Proposition 3 Signals will raise the minimum discount factor required to
sustain collusion whenever
α <
1− σh
1− σh + σl
and will reduce the minimum discount factor otherwise.
Proof: Rearranging the inequality
δS =
1
1 + (1− α)σh − α (1− σl) >
1
2 (1− α) = δnoS
we obtain the condition on α as stated in Proposition 3. 
We can now state the main result of our analysis:
Proposition 4
(i) If α ≥ σh1+σh−σl , collusive equilibria do not exist even if demand signals
are available.
(ii) If α ∈
[
1
2 ,
σh
1+σh−σl
)
, demand signals allow for collusion to be sustained
where this is not possible without signals.
(iii) If α ∈
[
1−σh
1−σh+σl ,
1
2
)
, collusion can be sustained with or without signals,
but signals facilitate collusion by reducing the minimum discount factor required
to sustain collusion.
(iv) If α < 1−σh1−σh+σl , collusion can be sustained with or without signals, but
signals raise the minimum discount factor required to sustain collusion.
Proof: follows from Propositions 2 and 3, where 1−σh1−σh+σl <
1
2 is implied by
our assumption that the signals are informative, i.e. σl > 12 and σh >
1
2 .
The last part of Proposition 4 is the key result of this paper. Intuitively, the
availability of signals affects the minimum discount factor in two ways: First,
signals reduce δS by allowing firms to reduce the probability of Nash reversion
when a negative demand shock occurred in a collusive period. Second, signals
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increase δS because a firm which undercuts has a higher chance to get away
with it, and so the temptation to defect increases. Now, for low levels of α, this
second (negative) effect will dominate the first (positive) effect, leading to an
overall increase in δS .
Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 4 graphically for the case where σh = σl
(i.e. signal precision is the same for both demand states). This assumption
reduces the relevant parameter space to two dimensions and hence facilitates
graphical representation.3 Condition α < σh1+σh−σl then simplifies to α < σh,
while condition α < 1−σh1−σh+σl simplifies to α < 1− σh.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
Finally, let us compare the expected discounted present value of collusion
with and without signals.
Proposition 5 The expected discounted present value of collusion is always
higher with signals than without signals.
Proof: Inserting the optimal probabilities β∗1 = β
∗
2 = β
∗
3 = 0 and β
∗
4 from
Proposition 1 into the objective function, we obtain the maximal payoff when
signals are available as
v (δ, α, σl, σh) =
Πm
2
(1− α)σh − α (1− σl)
σh (1− δ)
while the maximal payoff without signals is
v (δ, α) =
Πm
2
1− 2α
1− δ
The inequality v (δ, α, σl, σh) > v (δ, α) reduces to σl + σh > 1, which holds by
our assumption that the signals are informative, i.e. σl > 12 and σh >
1
2 .
5 Discussion
A canonical example of a trade association helping in enforcing a collusive ar-
rangement is the Sugar Institute analyzed by Genesove and Mullin (2001). This
3For general values of σh and σl, these conditions are not linear in signal precision. Thus,
the four regions into which Proposition 4 divides the parameter space will not generally be of
equal size.
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trade association was formed by 14 firms comprising nearly all the cane sugar
refining capacity in the United States, and operated from December 1927 until
1936. Among other things, it collected information on its members’ business
conduct through its own investigators, and if it found indications of cheating,
provided a forum for accusation and rebuttal.
One interesting analogy to our model is that the reported information was
not fully reliable:
The accusation could be factually wrong: a concession on one
barrel of caked sugar was wrongly reported as a concession on a much
larger amount of powdered sugar by a Sugar Institute investigator.
Or a firm employee or direct broker may simply have made an error
in invoicing or shipping. (p. 389)
Most significantly, the punishment mechanism of the cartel differed markedly
from the predictions of collusion theory in that retaliation was not immediate;
instead, ”the Sugar Institute served as a court”, providing a mechanism ”by
which firms can first judge whether cheating has in fact occurred before taking
action.” (p. 389) In other words, punishment was conditioned on ”additional
evidence” that went well beyond a first suspicion: ”Market share is a noisy
indicator of cheating; and with direct evidence available, the refiners evidently
preferred to rely on that instead.” (p. 394)
The authors argue that this approach ”delayed, and perhaps restricted, re-
taliation against violations of the agreement” (p. 387). They quote several
instances where deviators got away with what was very likely an attempt to
cheat. ”...Firms accept some cheating so as not to punish inappropriately.” (p.
393) While it remains mysterious how cheating can actually occur along the
collusive path, the model we analyzed above stresses precisely this trade-off be-
tween Type I and Type II error, and how signals tilt the trade-off in favor of
less punishment, at the risk of letting deviators get away with it.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the Sugar Institute ceased to operate in 1936,
when the Supreme Court ruled its practices illegal. However, judging from the
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Figures provided on p. 382, the Lerner Index did not change significantly in
subsequent years (and it certainly did not return to the low levels preceding the
formation of the Sugar Institute). One interpretation could be that the collusive
equilibrium remained sustainable even though the industry was deprived of the
”services” provided by its trade association.
The most important implication of our analysis for antitrust policy is there-
fore that removing a monitoring device may not be sufficient to put an end to
collusion in an industry. Without any accompanying measures, collusion may
in fact continue even after such an intervention. Collusion will certainly be
less profitable than before (demand information unambiguously raises the net
present value of collusion), but ironically, collusion may actually become easier
(and not harder) to sustain. Thus, a harsh stance against information exchange
among firms is important, but must be complemented by further policies to
make sure that cartels cease to operate.
6 Conclusion
We analyzed a symmetric Bertrand duopoly model with uncertain demand,
where one firm’s prices are unobservable to its competitor, but firms receive
noisy public signals about the state of demand. First, I show that the optimal
collusive strategy is as follows: Firms never punish if they both make positive
profits, or if they make zero profits and the demand signal indicates that demand
was low; if they make zero profits and the demand signal indicates that demand
was high, they will switch to Nash reversion with strictly positive probability.
Next, I studied the existence of such collusive equilibria compared to the
benchmark case without demand signals. I found that for a discount factor
arbitrarily close to 1, these signals allow for tacit collusion to be sustainable if
the probability of low-demand states is high, i.e. in cases where collusion would
have been impossible absent signals.
On the other hand, if the probability of negative demand shocks is low,
there are actually cases where tacit collusion will be more difficult to sustain
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with signals (in the sense that firms will have to be more patient) than without
signals. The reason is that in order to take advantage of the information that
becomes available, firms need to soften the threat of punishment, which may
increase the temptation to undercut the rival, thus creating severe incentive
problems.
Nonetheless, the expected discounted present value of collusion is always
higher with signals than without signals.
Revisiting the Sugar Institute Case studied in Genesove and Mullin (2001),
we saw that the enforcement problems that this particular cartel seems to have
faced strikingly recall the ones studied in this paper. We concluded that a policy
which fights monitoring devices will always reduce the profitability of collusion,
but may not always be successful in breaking collusion; on the contrary, collusion
may actually be facilitated by the removal of demand information.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
We start with part (ii) of Proposition 1. Observe that v = 0. Simplify and
rearrange the objective function,
v = (1− α) Πm/2 + δ
4∑
i=1
pii [(1− βi) v + βiv]
to read
vOF =
(1− α) Πm/2
1− δ
4∑
i=1
pii (1− βi)
(the subscript OF will help us to distinguish the objective function from the
incentive constraint, IC).
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The value of collusion, v, is strictly decreasing in β1 and β2:
∂vOF
∂βi
= − (1− α) Π
m/2[
1− δ
4∑
i=1
pii (1− βi)
]2 δpii < 0 for βi ∈ {βi}4i=1
Likewise, rearrange the incentive constraint (1) to read
v ≥ (1− α) Π
m
1− δ {(pi2 + pi3) (1− β3) + (pi1 + pi4) (1− β4)}
We see that β1 and β2 enter the incentive constraint only on the left-hand
side, through v, while they do not affect the value of defection, i.e. the right-
hand side of (1). Hence, reducing β1 and β2 both increases the objective function
and relaxes the incentive constraint. Therefore, it must be optimal to set β1
and β2 to their lowest possible value, i.e. β∗1 = β
∗
2 = 0.
We will now show that β∗3 = 0. Setting β
∗
1 = β
∗
2 = 0 and inserting for
{pii}4i=1, the objective function simplifies to
vOF =
(1− α) Πm/2
1− δ (1− α)− δασl (1− β3)− δα (1− σl) (1− β4)
Given that ∂vOF∂βi < 0 for β3 and β4, the incentive constraint will be bind-
ing under any solution of our maximization problem. Rewrite the incentive
constraint (1) as
vIC =
(1− α) Πm
1− δ {[(1− α) (1− σh) + ασl] (1− β3) + [(1− α)σh + α (1− σl)] (1− β4)}
Now, take the total differential of the incentive constraint:
dvIC =
∂vIC
∂β3
dβ3 +
∂vIC
∂β4
dβ4 = 0
to solve for the marginal rate of substitution between β3 and β4:
dβ3
dβ4
= −∂vIC/∂β4
∂vIC/∂β3
= − (1− α)σh + α (1− σl)
(1− α) (1− σh) + ασl < 0
Next, evaluate the total change in the objective function when β3 and β4 are
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traded off against each other according to this marginal rate of substitution:
dvOF =
∂vOF
∂β3
dβ3 +
∂vOF
∂β4
dβ4
=
∂vOF
∂β3
(
− (1− α)σh + α (1− σl)
(1− α) (1− σh) + ασl dβ4
)
+
∂vOF
∂β4
dβ4
=
(1− α) Πm/2
[D]2
δαdβ4
[
σl
(1− α)σh + α (1− σl)
(1− α) (1− σh) + ασl − (1− σl)
]
where D denotes the denominator of vOF . Now, our assumptions on parameters
imply that
(1− α) Πm/2
[D]2
δα > 0
and that
σl
(1− α)σh + α (1− σl)
(1− α) (1− σh) + ασl − (1− σl) > 0
(the latter reduces to (1− α) (σh + σl − 1) > 0, which is indeed satisfied by our
assumption that the signals are informative, σl > 12 and σh >
1
2 .)
Hence, we can conclude that
sign (dvOF ) = sign (dβ4)
i.e. a reduction in β3, matched by an increase in β4 just sufficient for the in-
centive constraint to remain binding, will unambiguously increase the objective
function. Therefore, it must be optimal to set β3 to its lowest possible value,
i.e. β∗3 = 0.
It remains to show the solution for β∗4 . Insert β
∗
3 = 0 into vOF and vIC , and
equate the two to solve for β∗4 as
β∗4 =
1− δ
δ [(1− α)σh − α (1− σl)]
Let us now turn to part (i) of Proposition 1. For the expression above to
be a valid solution, we must have β∗4 ∈ (0, 1]. Recall that δ ∈ (0, 1), so that
(1− δ) /δ > 0. Thus, for β∗4 > 0 to be satisfied, we must have that
(1− α)σh − α (1− σl) > 0
This expression can be rearranged to read
α <
σh
1 + σh − σl
21
as stated in Proposition 1. Now, we must also have β∗4 ≤ 1. This condition can
be rearranged to read
δ ≥ 1
1 + (1− α)σh − α (1− σl)
Given that (1− α)σh − α (1− σl) > 0, the right-hand side of this expression is
strictly smaller than 1. Thus, if δ can be arbitrarily close to 1, the condition
β∗4 ≤ 1 will always be satisfied. This concludes the proof of Proposition 1.
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